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Muscat: Judicial Sensitivity Rather Than Creativity? 
 
 
Marina Hamilton*  
 
 
The decision in the Court of Appeal in Cable & Wireless plc v Muscat [2006]1 has 
built on the recent decisions in Dacas v Brook Street Bureau2 and Franks v Reuter 3  
whereby the courts have recognised the necessity to take an inclusive approach to 
employee status where long term agency workers are concerned. This is, as is stressed 
in the judgment, fulfilling the intentions of Parliament in the unfair dismissal 
legislation; however, where issue can be taken with the judgment is the assertion that 
this is not driven by policy considerations. As will be demonstrated the recent agency 
worker decisions do finally give weight to the intentions of Parliament but have done 
so following a very tortuous route of previous policy decisions. 
 
Today’s commercial environment, together with favourable judicial decisions, has 
allowed for the creation of a flexible workforce. Atypical working has become the 
norm in all establishments hiring labour.  Labour is consequently purchased and sold 
under diverse forms of contractual arrangements. Whether this is to accommodate a 
dynamic commercial environment which demands a fluid workforce and new family-
friendly policies or to avoid some of the statutory protection afforded to employees 
rather than workers is debateable. 
 
Being an employee is the gateway to some statutory protection.4 This as we will see 
as a result of judicial activism has become a higher threshold of eligibility to cross 
than that of worker.5  However, ask many of those who fail to have the status of 
employee on dismissal at the time they entered the contract to hire their labour what 
they considered their employment status to be, it is unlikely that they would 
appreciate the subtleties let alone comprehend them. By contrast those setting up 
arrangements fully understanding and in the knowledge that by having independent 
contractor status, i.e working under a contract for services, they will gain financially, 
usually at the expense of the Inland Revenue, can find themselves in spite of all 
measures taken having employee status thrust upon them.6 It is hard to escape the 
conclusion that policy has a very strong role to play in this area of employment law. 
 
Parliament has provided very little legislative assistance in the definition of employee. 
S230 (1)7 provides that an employee is: “an individual who has entered into or works 
under (or where employment has ceased worked) under a contract of employment.” 
                                                 
*LLB Programme Director, School of Law, University of Hertfordshire.  
1 [2006] EWCA Civ 220. 
2 [2004] EWCA Civ 217. 
3 [2003] EWCA  Civ 417. 
4 Unfair dismissal, redundancy, s.1 statement of written terms, guaranteed payments, minimum notice 
periods and time off for public duties.  
5 Worker being the term used to give inclusive effect to employment rights often deriving from the EC. 
6 R (on application of Professional Contractors Group Ltd ) v Inland Revenue Commissioners (2001) 
EWCA Civ 1945. 
7 Employment Rights Act 1996. 
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A contract of employment in s.230 (2)8 is defined as “a contract of service or 
apprenticeship, whether express or implied and, (if it is express) whether oral or in 
writing.” 
 
As such, much of the case law in this area has turned on whether or not an individual 
is working under a contract of service. Whether a worker is working under a contract 
of service will depend on the interpretation of the contract which they entered into. 
The common law development in this area has the distinction of creating complexities 
beyond the notion of being employed or self-employed. Those not self-employed can 
be divided into those who work under a contract of service and are therefore 
employees and those who do not who can be referred to as independent contractors. 
Independent in so far as they are independent of much of employment protection but 
many lack any other true independence from the person paying for their labour. The 
question has to be asked as to whether it was truly the intention of Parliament to allow 
only those falling within an exclusive common law definition of employee as 
determined by the individual contractual arrangements of the parties to gain the 
benefits of certain statutory protection. It remains to be seen if current thinking on 
agency workers employed for a long period of time will provide a solution to certain 
elements of the workforce finding themselves so easily removed from fundamental 
employment law protection by individual contractual arrangements. 
 
To return to the assertion that the decision in Cable and Wireless v Muscat9 is not 
driven by policy is to ignore the development of the tests used in determining 
employee status and the way in which they reflect the labour markets of their time. 
Text books dismiss the control test as developed in Yewens v Noakes10  as outdated 
and anachronistic. Contemporary business models in a technological age recognise 
that as labour becomes increasingly skilled detailed control of the manner in which 
the work is carried out is impracticable. However, part of the irreducible minimum 
which an employee must have is that he is subject to the ultimate or residual control 
of the employer.11 So although the common law has abandoned the control test as the 
sole determination of employee status its role is not completely defunct. 
 
The control test has survived as part of the irreducible minimum required for 
employee status. This test has therefore had a longer shelf life than the so called 
integration or economic reality test. In Stevenson, Jordan & Harrison v Macdonald & 
Evans12 Lord Denning suggested that an individual worked under a contract of service 
if his work was an integral part of the business. This neatly dealt with criticisms of the 
control test which had a conceptual difficulty in dealing with a skilled workforce. 
However, to have such an inclusive definition would hit at employers seeking to have 
a flexible workforce that they can more or less hire and fire at will to cope with 
fluctuations in the demand for labour. The same would be true of the economic reality 
test as used by the courts in Market Investigations v Minister of Social Security 
[1969]13 and Airfix Footwear Ltd v Cope [1978]14. In Market Investigations the court 
                                                 
8 ERA 1996. 
9  [2006] EWCA Civ 220. 
10 (1880) 6 QBD 530.  
11 See post p.3 also Zuijs v Wirth Bros. (1955) 93 CLR 561 & Motorola v Davies [2001] IRLR 4. 
12  [1952] 1 TLR 101. 
13  [1969] 2 QB 173. 
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asserted the less skilled the workforce and the less training they received the less 
likely it would be that such an individual would be found to be self employed. It is 
interesting to note that today even if such workers engaged in some market research 
activities do have employee status they tend to be paid a modest amount per hour with 
a bonus per hit, i.e. when the cold call or clip board questionnaire converts into a sales 
appointment or usable data. To some extent therefore the employee assumes some of 
the business risk.  
 
In the Airfix case Mrs Cope was found to be an employee as it was found that the 
economic reality of the situation was that she was selling her labour power rather than 
aiming to gain any profit from the carrying on of a business. Sophisticated payment 
schemes such as bonus, performance related pay, and share option schemes do give 
some employees a vested interest in the well being and profitability of a company. 
This is reflective of the modern view of employees as stakeholders involved in a 
social contract with their employer rather than their having become independent 
contractors. Being a member of such a scheme will not however, guarantee 
employment status, it at best is a term of the contract consistent with there being a 
contract of service.15 Additionally the current predilection for complex organisational 
structures, particularly in terms of outsourcing and project working, could 
accommodate neither the business integration test nor the economic reality test.  
 
In Cable & Wireless v Muscat16 part of the rationale for allowing the implication of a 
contract between a worker and the end user of his services in a tripartite agency 
relationship was by relying on part of the judgement in The Aramis17 by Bingham LJ: 
 
 “I also agree that no such contract should be implied on the facts of any given 
case unless it is necessary to do so; necessary that is to say, in order to give 
business reality to a transaction and to create enforceable obligations between 
parties who are dealing with one another in circumstances in which one would 
expect that business reality and those enforceable obligations to exist.” 
 
This however, is more a reflection of the justification of the implication of a 
contractual relationship between the end user in an agency relationship and the worker 
using basic contractual principles of the implication of terms18 demanded by factual 
necessity of the situation than an attempt to reinvent the business integration test or 
economic reality test. This reliance on a basic contractual doctrine to achieve an end 
to the uncomfortable situation as found in Montgomery v Johnson,19 whereby it was 
possible for an agency worker to be neither the employee of the end user/hirer nor the 
agency, is ironic when viewed along side the judicially contrived irreducible 
minimum required for achieving employee status. 
 
The definition of employee has been refined and developed into a multiple test, 
whereby all relevant factors are weighed against one another. The root of this 
                                                                                                                                            
14  [1978] ICR 1210. 
15 Supra n.3, para 2. 
16  [2006] EWCA Civ 220. 
17 [1989] 1 Lloyds Rep 213. 
18 The Moorcock [1886-90] All ER 530 Shirlaw  v Southern Foundries [1939] 2 KB 206. 
19 [2001] EWCA Civ 318.  
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approach is found in Ready Mixed Concrete (South East Ltd) v Minister of Pensions 
and National Insurance.20 Decisions following on from Ready Mixed Concrete have 
formulated an irreducible minimum required for employee status. As such there must 
be personal service, a sufficient degree of control and mutuality of obligation. Having 
achieved the irreducible minimum which is an absolute requirement of there being a 
contract of services, employee status will only be present if other provisions of the 
contract are consistent with their being a contract of service, the so called ‘factual 
matrix’. 
 
In Express & Echo Publications v Tanton21 it was held that if a contract permits the 
performance of the contractual obligation by another, regardless of what happens in 
practice unless the provision is a sham then there can not be a contract of service. 
However, if the choice of substitution is limited then employee status may still be 
possible as in McFarlane v Glasgow City Council,22 where the ability to delegate was 
limited to a council list of aerobic teachers. It is interesting to note that in Muscat v 
Cable & Wireless23 the contract between the agency used by Cable & Wireless to deal 
with those it considered to be independent contractors and the workers did contain a 
substitution clause which allowed for the provision of suitably qualified substitutes 
subject to the approval of the client (C&W). This provision was not relied on in the 
appeal. 
 
Case law has continued to require that for employee status to be present the employer 
must have a sufficient degree of control over the employee in order for a contract of 
service to exist.24 This has proven problematic for agency workers in particular who 
may be under the control of the agency for the purposes of receiving remuneration 
and administration of PAYE, but are given their day to day orders by the end user/ 
hirer as to their activities, with whom they may not have an express contract. 
Motorolla v Davidson25 suggested that in such arrangements it did not matter that 
control was shared as long as the alleged employer had sufficient control. As such 
depending on the other elements of the irreducible minimum being present and the 
construction of the contract itself, the factual matrix, it is feasible that either the 
agency or the end user/ hirer of the worker could be the employer rather than a finding 
that a worker is nobody’s employee as in Montgomery26 
 
Finally the irreducible minimum required for a contract of service to exist is that of 
mutuality of obligation.  This concept goes beyond the basic contractual principle of a 
promise for a promise, on a basic level the promise to pay in return for the promise to 
work, to a commitment to ongoing relations. It has become a two-tiered concept, 
firstly that a contract must exist and secondly that that contract must involve an 
obligation to offer and accept work.  The application of this concept has been 
particularly damaging to casual workers as demonstrated by both O’Kelly v 
Trusthouse Forte plc27 and Carmichael v National Power.28 To prevent such workers 
                                                 
20  [1968] 2 QB 497. 
21 [1999] IRLR 367. 
22  [2001] IRLR 7. 
23  [2006] EWCA Civ 220. 
24 Supra n.2.  
25 [2001] IRLR 4. 
26 [2001] EWCA Civ 318 . 
27 [1984] QB 90. 
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gaining employees status is consistent with an exclusive policy on employment rights 
but can not be justified as consistent with general principles of contract law. Its 
justification has to lie in the maintenance of a flexible workforce available to satisfy 
supply and demand. Carmichael goes further and states that employee status did exist 
in each period of engagement but no global contract could be read between 
engagements to achieve continuity of employment as no mutuality of obligation 
existed in these periods. Such a denial of mutuality of obligation in both of the above 
circumstances is to strike a blow at the probably most economically vulnerable in the 
market place. However, such a policy is consistent with attitudes to those workers 
who are not integral to the employer’s business.29  
 
Perhaps a sea change in attitude is on the horizon as can be demonstrated not just by 
current developments with regards to agency workers but also by the decision in 
Cornwall County Council v Prater.30 In Prater the claimant worked as part of a home 
tutor service used by the local authority to educate children who could not attend 
school. The tutor was always asked if she was willing to take a pupil and always had 
the option to refuse. Such a potential to refuse work even if as in the case of O’ Kelly 
the result would be the offer of less work defeated the second tier of the concept of 
the mutuality of obligation in so far as there must be a commitment to ongoing 
relations. Cases such as Carmichael31 and Clark v Oxford Health Authority32 were 
distinguished in Prater33 as when she did agree to take on work the duration would be 
for as long as was necessary, in one case the same child was tutored for five years. As 
such mutuality of obligation existed beyond the individual assignments as her 
assignments were much more open ended than those of Carmichael34 and Clark.35  
Mrs Prater was successful in her claim and her status of employee provided the 
necessary gateway to give her continuity of employment from 1988. The periods 
between assignments were found to be temporary cessations of work as defined by 
s.212 ERA 1996, the EAT resolutely refused to allow Mrs Prater’s argument that she 
worked under a global contract. Again here we are finding that the tribunal is 
unwilling to allow employers to escape liability for employees where there has been a 
long history of consistent working. 
 
Ironically in the recent agency cases such as Muscat36 the stumbling block with regard 
to mutuality of obligation has been in the first tier of the concept, in the sense that 
there may well be an intention to have an ongoing relationship but no express 
contractual relationship existed. The court’s willingness to imply a contract into the 
relationship between end user/hirer and the worker where express contracts only exist 
                                                                                                                                            
28 [2000] IRLR 43.  
29 Atkinson in Manpower Strategies for Flexible Organisations (1984) Personnel Management 28 
reiterated his theory of firm whereby core group workers with firm specific skills would receive high 
quality working conditions and employment rights, the peripheral worker with less firm specific skills 
would often be hired on fixed term or part time contracts, and external groups of workers would be 
utilised but not employed by the firm e.g. the self employed or those hired through agencies. 
30 [2006] EWCA Civ 102. 
31 [2000] IRLR 43. 
32 [1998] IRLR 125. 
33 [ 2006] EWCA Civ 102. 
34 [2000] IRLR 43. 
35 [1998] IRLR 125. 
36 [2006] EWCA Civ 220 see also Dacas [2004] EWCA Civ 217 & Franks [2003] EWCA  Civ 417. 
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between the agency and the worker and the end user/hirer and the agency has 
demonstrated that indeed the courts are fulfilling the will of Parliament under s.230 
(2).37 The true impetus for such action surely has to be the increased use of agency 
workers not just to fill temporary gaps in the labour pool of the enterprise but as a 
long term solution to human resource issues.  
 
Cable & Wireless v Muscat38 is the first decision to follow up on the reasoning in 
Dacas and Reuters39 and deal with the potential inequities created by cases such as 
Montgomery v Johnson.40 Mrs Johnson was found to be neither the employee of the 
end hirer of her labour nor the employee of the agency in spite of having worked for 
the same location for the same client through the same agency for two years. It is 
these longer, open ended relationships that were proving to be unsatisfactory. 
Legislation still failed to address the issue directly in the Conduct of Employment 
Agencies and Employment Regulations 2003 which came into force on 6th April 
2004. The Regulations provide that a contract exists between the agency and the 
worker, but whether that contract is a contract of service or not is still dependent on 
the case law. The Secretary of State has the power under s.23 ERA 1999 to bring 
certain categories of employees within such protection; as yet no such action has been 
taken. It is still the courts that are driving policy in this are despite assertions to the 
contrary in Muscat.41 
 
Dacas v Brook Street Bureau42 followed the reasoning in Montgomery in finding that 
an agency could not be the employer if there was an absence of mutuality of 
obligation or a lack of a sufficient degree of control as that precluded the existence of 
a contract of service. If the agency was not the employer then could the end user/hirer 
of the worker be deemed to employ the worker under a contract of service? Mrs 
Dacas had worked exclusively for Wandsworth Borough Council for six years. She 
was dismissed by the council after swearing at a visitor. She claimed unfair dismissal 
but then found herself in difficulty as to whom she should bring the claim against. 
With regard to the agency, Brook Street there was a lack of mutuality of obligation 
between the two and as such there was no contract of service subsisting between the 
two. Brook Street had no obligation to provide work nor did Mrs Dacas have any 
obligation to accept it.  Brook Street also had some residual control for Mrs Dacas’ 
activities but it was the hirer who gave the day to day orders and of course ultimately 
disposed of her services. Brook Street also had a clause in their contract that the 
contract with the agency would not give rise to a contract of employment. The 
intentions of the parties can be indicative of the relationship but is not always 
conclusive.43  
 
                                                 
37 ERA 1996 “a contract of service or apprenticeship, whether express or implied and, (if it is express) 
whether oral or in writing.” 
38 [2006] EWCA Civ 220 see also Dacas [2004] EWCA Civ 217. 
& Franks [2003] EWCA  Civ 417. 
39 Supra n.36. 
40 [2001] EWCA Civ 318. 
41 [2006] EWCA Civ 220, para 53. 
42 [2004] IRLR 358. 
43 Ferguson v Dawson [1976] 3 All ER 817 cp Massey v Crown Life Insurance Co. [1978] 1 WLR 676. 
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However, in Stevedoring and Haulage Services v Fuller44 it was held that it was not 
possible to imply a contract of employment where the parties had expressly agreed 
that there would be no such contract. As such it will always be difficult to establish 
that a contract of employment exists between the agency and the worker. 
Unfortunately by the time the issue had arrived in the Court of Appeal Mrs Dacas had 
dropped the council from the claim and as such the comments were made obiter. The 
court indicated it would have been willing to imply a contract between the hirer and 
the worker, but not to create an umbrella contract which would open the door for 
claims in Carmichael and Clark45 scenarios. Such a contract could be implied as 
indicated in Franks v Reuters46 where: “Dealings between the parties over a period of 
years as distinct from days or months typical of casual work are capable of 
generating an implied contractual relationship.” Following Dacas in Astbury v Gist47 
there is a positive obligation on the court or tribunal to investigate whether or not an 
implied contract exists between a hirer and a worker. It is further suggested that an ET 
should join parties to any action to ensure that the claimant has a proper remedy. 
 
Cable & Wireless v Muscat48 has finally brought a rational solution to the problem of 
agency workers who are not truly temporary or peripheral in their place of work.  It is 
again the courts that are providing solutions to socio economic difficulties 
encountered by the encouragement of the creation of a flexible workforce going 
where Parliament fears to tread too heavily. The ‘Success at Work’ policy published 
by the current administration promises to protect vulnerable workers and identify 
ways to simplify employment legislation. However, the author feels that politicians 
are unlikely to upset the status quo when the courts are managing so admirably to 
balance the competing factors of management prerogative and access to employment 
rights of the atypical workforce. To that extent Lady Jane Smith is right in that the 
decision in Muscat has been decided according to established law, however, it is only 
by the judicial creativity of previous decisions that finally the balance between the 
economic needs of business to be able to make good use of the flexible labour market 
and the needs to prevent the choice of employment model to dictate access to basic 
employment protection has been achieved. For a long time the courts have given 
decisions in favour of there being a contract of service where issues of health and 
safety have been concerned49 as matter of policy. The repercussions of the decision in 
Muscat must be that employers will take their dealings with employees sourced 
otherwise than directly as still being subject to additional employment protection and 
care will still have to be taken in their relationships with them. Therefore 
commercially the decision to employ through an agency on a long term basis may 
relieve an administrative burden and the costs could be justifiable on those grounds. 
Businesses using agencies may well insist on a redrafting of the contractual 
arrangements to either have the responsibility for the worker as employee jointly or 
severally or indeed to insist on some form of indemnity or increased involvement 
from the agencies. 
  
                                                 
44 [2001] IRLR 627. 
45  [2000] IRLR 43, [1998] IRLR 125. 
46 [2003] EWCA  Civ 417. 
47 [2005] WL 1104109. 
48  [2006] EWCA Civ 220. 
49 Lane v Shire Roofing [1995] IRLR 493. Ferguson v Dawson [1976] 3 All ER 817. 
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The decisions in both Muscat50 and Prater51 demonstrate the Courts’ appreciation of 
the complex models of employment that are available to employers. It also 
demonstrates a sophisticated appreciation of the intentions of Parliament to create a 
flexible labour market capable of encouraging economic growth and by necessity 
sacrificing some workers employment rights whilst not allowing an abuse of such 
mechanisms to take place. As such the exclusive term of employee may find its 
impact increasingly limited to only those truly transient employment placements 
filling either temporary holes or increases in demand.  
 
                                                 
50 [2006] ECWA Civ 220. 
51 [ 2006] EWCA Civ 102. 
